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“Extend the sphere, and you take in a variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority [and
under plurality, a minority] of the whole will have a
common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or, if
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in
unison with each other.”1
“New candidacies and new coalitions serving as viable
competition mean opportunity for substantive and public debate of
ideas—the foundation of democracy—and help limit misuse of
party power.”

Ù

Co-authored by Erin Carman, JD, LMSW and Vanessa Glushefski,
CPA, Esq. Erin is an associate professor for the MSW program at Daemen
College, a private university in Buffalo, NY. Vanessa is the former acting
Comptroller for the City of Buffalo and is currently working on pro bono work
in the area of Immigration Law. Vanessa ran for local office twice, and Erin
worked as campaign manager on a local campaign. The authors draw on these
experiences for the benefit of this article.
1
Baber v. Dunlap, 376 F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D. Me. 2018)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10) appeal dismissed No. 18-2250, 2018
WL 8583796 (1st Cir. Dec. 28, 2018).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The health of democracy is on the minds of many
Americans as they grow impatient with our current political system.
So, it is no surprise that Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) is gaining
more notice. The RCV election method contributes to the growth
of our local, state, and national democracies by increasing the
viability of candidacies, diversity of candidates, voter choice, and
number of candidates winning with a true majority. RCV allows
voters to vote based on their beliefs as opposed to making a choice
based on the fear of “spoiling” or “wasting” their vote.
RCV is a timely issue. Voters have increasingly adopted
RCV and supported first-time independent candidates in the face of
numerous threats to our democracy. In just the last three years,
voters made Maine the first state to adopt RCV and New York City,
the most populous city in the country, the 20th municipality to adopt
the method. That the electorate is energized by these changes and
appears to hold wide-spread interest in stepping outside of our twoparty system that is supported by the plurality, first-past-the-post
method of election is evidenced by growing resistance to
establishment candidates and the increasing number of people
identifying as independent.2 Voters are tired of candidates winning
with a low percentage of the vote through the first-past-the-post
system and of being forced to compromise their values in casting
their vote. RCV is one way to address the national and state changes
in election law and political processes and, therefore, more voters
should have RCV as an option for expanding local and state
democracies.
RCV exists interdependently with other election laws and
reform efforts. As a result, RCV may be more effective in furthering
the growth of our democracy if supplemented with additional
reforms. Through an examination of the history of American use of
RCV, coupled with a look at multiple election law reforms that
impact the core areas of democracy, we consider opportunities for
2
For the purpose of this paper, “independent” should be interpreted as
unaffiliated, not to be confused with members of the Independence Party.
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further reform that will strengthen the value of RCV to our
democracy. Specifically, we will assess campaign finance reform,
multimember districts, and ballot access reforms as strong potential
companion efforts to further the impact of RCV.
II. RCV DEFINED
RCV, which is alternatively referred to as preferential or
choice voting, is an election method aimed at ensuring a true
majority winner (50%+) instead of the plurality system currently
used in most American elections. Whereas RCV is the commonly
used umbrella terminology, it has several variations depending on
the structure of the district; in single member districts it is called
Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV) and in multi-member districts it is
called Single Transferable Vote (STV).3
The RCV process gives voters the opportunity to rank
candidates on their individual ballots. Once the polls close, the
ballot counting process begins with a review of all voters’ first
choice candidates. If a majority winner results from the first round,
that candidate is the winner and use of the instant run-off process is
not necessary. If there is no majority winner, the instant-runoff
process ensues. The candidate with the least first choice votes is
eliminated and the votes for that candidate are counted towards the

3

See RCV Activist Toolkit, FAIRVOTE.ORG,
https://www.fairvote.org/toolkit#educate (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). These
authors recognize that RCV has many different names depending on the point in
time and location. For instance, internationally, it is common for RCV to be
referred to as proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR),
which is a multi-member district that allows for the ranking of candidates. The
idea of a single transferable vote (the operation of transferring one vote based
pursuant to one’s preference) has also been referred to as the “Hare system,” a
reference to the individual credited for its invention. See Clarence Gilbert,
Hallett Hoag, & George Hervey Jr., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION § 13 at 6
(1926). The RCV process for multi-member districts is slightly different, using a
threshold to determine winners. See discussion infra Part VI.B.
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second choice votes on all of those ballots.4 The process continues
like this until a winner is identified.56
RCV may be adopted through a variety of methods and may
vary in terms of guidelines. RCV may be adopted by charter or
legislation at any level of government. Laws adopting RCV
establish guidelines, which vary by municipality. Some RCV laws
set a maximum number of ranking slots on a ballot, as well as the
type of elected offices that will be determined through RCV.
Currently, RCV is used in twenty municipalities within ten
states, and one of the states (Maine) adopted the voting method
statewide. 7 Most recently, in November 2019, New York City
voters voted to amend the City Charter and adopt RCV as the
method to be used in primary and special elections.8 In 2016, Maine
adopted RCV for all state and federal primary elections and
implemented the process for the first time in the 2018 elections.
Minneapolis has used RCV since 2009, and San Francisco,
Oakland, and Berkley have been using RCV since 2010. This paper
will briefly look at RCV data from each of these municipalities to
illustrate outcomes of the RCV method, including the increased
likelihood of true majority candidates.9
Across municipalities and states, RCV is intended to
increase the likelihood of an election resulting in a true majority in
4

See Ranked Choice Voting, FAIRVOTE.ORG,
https://www.fairvote.org/rcv#how_rcv_works (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
5
See Jack Santucci, Evidence of a Winning-Cohesion Tradeoff in MutiWinner Ranked-Choice Voting, 52 ELECTORAL STUDIES 128, 128-38 (2018).
6
As part of this ballot counting process, ballot exhaustion may occur.
This is the process by which a ballot is no longer usable because all choices/
votes ranked on a given ballot have been reviewed, counted toward a subsequent
round, and all candidates chosen and ranked by that voter lost the race.
7
See Where Ranked Choice Voting is Used, FAIRVOTE.ORG,
https://www.fairvote.org/where_is_ranked_
choice_voting_used (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
8
New York was one of two dozen municipalities who adopted
a multi-member form RCV (PR) in the early twentieth century. See
Kevin Reyes, Redistricting or Rethinking? Why Proportional
Representation May Be a Better Solution Than California’s
Independent Redistricting Commission, 20 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 655,
674.(2011).
9
See discussion infra Part III.E.
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the first round or as a result of the ranking process, which allows
voters to rank preferences based on their own ideological priorities.
In doing so, RCV allows voters to vote based on their beliefs as
opposed to making a choice based on the fear of “spoiling” or
“wasting” their vote. Subsequent and related arguments for RCV
will be discussed following a contextualization of RCV in
American history.
III. RCV HISTORY
To most effectively understand the purpose and current state
of RCV, it is necessary to review its historical roots in American
elections. For that, we look at the history of proportional
representation (PR) here in the United States. In American history,
district structure and ranking were intertwined to comprise the
election method called PR. PR was paired with the singletransferable vote, allowing the voter to rank candidates, though not
all proportional representation models do. 10 PR is a method of
voting that aims to give equal representation to the district involved.
As opposed to single-member districts, the area is split into larger
districts or at-large districts, and instead of voting for one
representative, many representatives are elected. The ideal result is
for many viewpoints to be reflected in the district’s representatives.
A. The Rise of Proportional Representation
In 1910, before a Conservative Group in Glasgow, Scotland,
Arthur J. Balfour (afterward Earl Balfour) called for reform of a
seemingly age-old problem:
“[W]hile a small handful of interested people can
turn an election one way or the other on their own
personal issue, huge minorities, like the minority of
the Unionists in Scotland, are utterly and grossly
unrepresented. We give every little privilege to the
10
See generally How Proportional Representation Elections Work,
FAIRVOTE.ORG, https://www.fairvote.
org/how_proportional_representation_elections_work (Dec. 16, 2019).
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little knot of people in the individual constituencies;
we ignore the great mass who under our existing
system find no representation at all comparable
either to their numerical strength or to their public
spirit, or to any other quality, which makes them
useful, able, and independent citizens.”11
The call for reform was not limited to Scotland.
Accordingly, some of the greatest thinkers of our time called for the
adoption of PR as a solution. John Stuart Mill wrote at length of the
need for reform and true representation in the United Kingdom.12
Mill strongly believed that PR was a tool to create greater
engagement and increased diversity of thought:
“[i]ndependent opinions will force their way into the
council of the nation and make themselves heard
there, a thing which cannot often happen in the
current forms of representative democracy; and the
legislature, instead of being weeded of individual
peculiarities and entirely made up of men who
simply represent the creed of great political or
religious parties, will comprise a large proportion of
the most eminent minds of the country, placed there,
without reference to party, by the voters who
appreciated their individual eminence . . . [A]ny one
who does not feel the want which the scheme is
intended to supply; any one who throws it over as
mere theoretical subtlety or crotchet, tending to no
valuable purpose, and unworthy of the attention of
practical men, may be pronounced an incompetent
statesman, unequal to the politics of the future.”13
Leaders were skeptical of Mill’s perspective of PR; but,
some, such as Leonard H. Courtney, came to embrace the approach.
11

See Gilbert et. al., supra note 3, §173 at 299.
Id. at 293 (“My complaint is that the electors are not represented...
Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this
one affords the best security for the qualifications desirable in the
representatives…”).
13
Id. at 296 (quoting John Stuart Mill, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1875)).
12
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In a letter to the Prime Minister advocating for PR’s adoption,
Courtney admitted his apprehension, but, on Mill’s
recommendation, believed it could provide hope in the fight against
political corruption of the day:
“I was . . . strongly convinced of the injury done to
our national life by the deleterious training more or
less undergone by every man who is drawn into the
political world, and by the loss of men who are shut
out of it as refusing to submit to this training . . . Mr.
Mill hailed with enthusiasm the revelation of the true
principle of representation. It gave him, he said, a
new hope.”14
These same problems abroad were mirrored in American
municipalities. One of the focal concerns was voter
disenfranchisement. In Cincinnati, for example, critics of American
politics at the time believed that this disenfranchisement was a
result of disproportionate party power (the Democratic party was
“weak,” and a “Republican nomination amounted to an election”).15
“Candidates were trained to feel they were representatives not of
the public, but of the party.”16 The parties had a stronghold on the
entire system. The effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the elected
individual was irrelevant; what mattered was whether the party
leaders were willing to re-nominate or not.17
In response, community leaders formed a committee to
implement reforms, including the adoption of PR. Of the
committee organizers involved, women from both the League of
Women Voters and the Woman’s City Club were critical to the
movement. 18 The committee organized a speaking tour and

14

Id. at 298 (quoting Letter from Leonard Courtney to W.E. Gladstone,
Prime Minister (Nov. 8, 1884) [hereinafter Lord Courtney of Penwith] in
support of the adoption of proportional representation and its incorporation in
the Redistribution Bill).
15
See Henry Bently, Why Cincinnati Voted for P.R. and a City
Manager, 14 NAT’L MUN. REV. 69, 69 (1925).
16
Id.
17
Id at 70.
18
Id. at 72.
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gathered media support. In the end, Cincinnati was successful and
PR was adopted with a vote of 92,510 to 41,105.19
B. Proportional Representation’s Impact on Democracy
PR successfully diluted party monopolies while setting the
stage for more ethnic and racial minorities to be elected in districts
where they had not:
“Many [who advocated for PR] were concerned
[aside from issues of child labor laws and woman’s
suffrage] about the corruption in urban governments.
Large cities often were dominated by party
“machines” of which Tammany Hall . . . was the
most infamous . . . . [PR] also encouraged fairer
racial and ethnic representation . . . . It produced the
first Irish Catholics elected in Ashtabula, and the first
Polish Americans elected in Toledo. In Cincinnati,
Hamilton, and Toledo African Americans had never
been able to win city office until the coming of PR.
Significantly, after these cities abandoned PR,
African Americans again found it almost impossible
to get elected.”20
Another example of this regarded success is illustrated by
Mr. Samuael Seabury’s response to the unsuccessful attempt to
dissuade the New York public from repealing PR. To relay PR’s
impact of diluting party monopolies, Seabury recounted the days
when the powerful New York City political organization, Tammany
Hall, “steam rolled” over everyone in its path and the positive
changes witnessed in the city’s government afterward. Seabury
shared these contemporaneous observations:
“The Tammany steam roller has stopped and the
quality of Council action has steadily improved . . . .
19

Id.
Douglas Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES 267, 269 (2d ed. 2002)
(emphasis added).
20
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From the first, with the cooperation of members on
both sides of the aisle, it has passed all the important
measures before it . . . that were obviously needed for
the welfare of the city . . . . After the Democrats got
over their first outraged shock at finding a substantial
and vocal opposition, its procedure has become on
the whole orderly and constructive . . . . Hearings are
held on important measures at which the public is
given courteous attention and many of its
suggestions adopted, and debate on the floor brings
out all important issues of controversial questions.
Most bills are passed in a form approved by virtually
the whole council, often because suggestions of the
minority members have been accepted by the
majority.21
Of all the democratic improvements attributed to PR’s
success, a significant increase in voter turnout was not one of them.
Instead, the data indicated the “emergence and disappearance of
local issues and candidates appear to have had more to do with the
act of voting than did the form of the ballot.”22 History shows that
companion reforms to the PR (and ranking) process were necessary
then as well.
C. The Fall
PR was not supported by all. On the heels of the widely
regarded success of PR came a series of well-funded attacks in each

21

Samuel Seabury, Letter to the Editor: In Favor of PR, N.Y. TIMES ,
Oct. 31, 1947.
22
See Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 20, at 271.
Though, for some this may seem like an argument against adopting some form
of choice voting, the authors believe it is quite the contrary. In a district where
RCV is employed and is successful in driving more exciting candidates and
issues, it is quite possible that voter turnout, especially over time, will be
favorably affected. However, if in the same district, RCV is employed, but
existing ballot access issues prevent viable candidacies of these would-be
candidates, one could imagine that voter turnout will not be favorably affected.
See discussion infra Part VI.
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municipality that had adopted it.23 Anti-PR leaders and coalitions
led forty-nine attempts to repeal PR. 24 The strategy for repeal
involved a propaganda campaign that sought to scare voters into
repealing the relatively new reforms. Ultimately, the strategy was an
overwhelming success and PR was repealed in every jurisdiction
except Cambridge, Massachusetts.
The anti-PR propaganda and repeal campaign took shape
differently depending on the municipality. In New York City, the
repeal campaign took on the form of anti-communist sentiment,
which was reflected in an editorial by The New York Times
editorial board. 25 The editorial board used its considerable

23
See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947 (an appeal to voters to
repeal PR, while acknowledging that it had “endorsed” PR and “defended it
against its critics.”). In Cleveland, both the Republicans and Democrats sought
to repeal PR, yet the success of Cleveland’s new government was “almost
universally acclaimed,” and “everyone admitted the Council was the best
Cleveland had ever had.” As a result, the reason for the repeal was largely seen
as an effort by the parties to regain power. Norman Shaw, Cleveland’s
Proportional Representation Election,14 NAT’L MUN. REV.589, 589-90 (1925).
24
See Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of
Proportional Representation in Local Governments in the United States, in
ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 149
(Bernard Grofman & Arend Liphart eds., 1986). These forty-nine attempts
occurred over multiple election cycles.
25
However, the anti-communism sentiment could have been “dog
whistle” language for racism as well. See, e.g., IMANI PERRY, LOOKING FOR
LORRAINE 43-59 (2018) (describing Lorraine’s involvement in the Communist
Party, its funding of Freedom [a progressive newspaper], and the U.S.
government’s targeting of prominent Black, communist activists including
Lorraine herself, W.E.B. Dubois, and Paul Robeson). The Communist Party was
also affiliated with the National Negro Congress, a group that advocated against
Jim Crow and was instrumental in finding solid working-class jobs for African
Americans. See National Negro Congress, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-andmaps/national-negro-congress (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). Additionally, Pete
Cacchione, one of the communists elected to the New York City Council in
1941, whom the Times editorial board found objectionable, was known to
advocate for “an end to all practices of discrimination whether directed against
the Negro people, the Italian people, the Jewish people, or the foreign born.” See
Amy, supra note 20, at 208.
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reputation to urge voters to repeal PR. 26 One of several reasons
listed for this anti-PR advocacy was that PR was a tool for radical
groups that threatened American elections:
“Communists and other radicals who could not, by
normal majority and district voting methods, have
hoped to become members and giving them an
official sounding-board for views shared only by a
mere fraction in the electorate.”27
The editorial board went on to chastise the PR elected
council for failing to take the important work of public
transportation fare reform in favor, rather, of “such trivialities” as
the name of Sixth Avenue. Samuel Seabury countered this attack in
a letter submitted to the council.28 Seabury argued that the council
had actually taken up many important issues that term, including
“evictions, rent control, abuses in garages and parking spaces, and
fire hazards in apartment hotels and dormitories,”29 suggesting the
editorial board was twisting the facts for its own ends, namely the
repeal of PR.
26
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947. The editorial board made a
similar appeal in April 1947.
27
This statement proved to be inaccurate and misleading. At least two
sources debunk the idea that these “radicals” were not widely supported by those
outside their party. In the case of Pete Cacchione, only 1/10 of the voters that
elected him were of the communist party. Because of his ideas, he was able to
gain the support of many working-class New Yorkers, and he received the most
first-place votes out of ALL council members in the 1943 election cycle. See
Amy, supra note 20, at 208; See also George H. Hallett, Jr., Importance of PR:
Abolishing Proportional Representation Believed Against Civic Good, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1947 (“What bothers [the editorial board] obviously is that there
are two Communists on the council, 8.7 percent of the whole body…The fact
remains that these particular Communists amassed 138,498 votes, which is 8.2
percent of total valid vote cast…You couldn’t get any closer to accuracy with
cutting Councilmen into fractions.”); Seabury, supra note 21.
28
It is assumed this is Judge Samuel Seabury, a direct relation of
Bishop Samuel Seabury. Judge Seabury served on the Court of Appeals and was
instrumental in investigating and uncovering corruption within the infamous
Tammany Hall. See Samuel Seabury Playground, NYCGOVPARKS.ORG,
https://www.nycgovparks.org/parks/samuel-seabury-playground/history (last
visited Dec. 9, 2019).
29
See Seabury, supra note 21.
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In Cincinnati, the repeal campaign used a different angle.
Elections of African American council members influenced what
was a race-based repeal campaign. Repeal proponents took
advantage of this and the growing tensions around the civil rights
movement and “warned whites that PR was helping to increase”
power in the African American community while raising the specter
of a future “Negro mayor.”30 Like those in New York City, repeal
proponents argued that minority and “fringe” perspectives uplifted
by PR were a threat to American democracy. By 1960, New York
City, Cincinnati, and every other municipality (with the exception
of Cambridge) had renounced the PR voting system that had offered
so much promise.31 The widely supported rise of PR for purposes
of increased equity and ideological diversity quickly led to fear
based attacks and the demise of the system.
The history of PR makes clear that its only true “fault” was
that it worked too well to be popular among entrenched interests.32
IV. IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF PR, RCV IMPROVES DEMOCRACY
RCV improves democratic processes and engagement by
promoting: (1) increased viability of candidacies; (2) broader
diversity of candidates; (3) increased voter choice; and (4) greater
likelihood of achieving a true majority winner. These are benefits
to voters, interested candidates, coalitions and parties, as well as
our greater democracy. RCV’s positive impact on democracy in
these four areas is evident through a preliminary review of RCV
data from three of the American cities that have implemented RCV
for the longest period of time: San Francisco, Berkeley, and
Minneapolis.
A. RCV creates opportunities for increased viability of candidacies.
When voters can rank candidates and there is a run-off
process, more candidates are viable and the pool of candidates is
more diverse. Viability of a candidacy commonly refers to the
ability of candidates and coalitions to competitively run races and
30
31
32

See Amy, REAL CHOICES/NEW VOICES, supra note 20, at 273.
See Weaver, supra note 24, at 140.
See Amy, supra note 20, at 274.
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for voters to perceive those candidates as actual options, not
spoilers. RCV establishes greater viability through factors such as
the likelihood of increased media coverage, the diminished impact
of majority party names over all others, and the increase in healthy
competition in campaigning, all of which stem from the increased
competition because of ranking and run-offs.
The increased viability of candidacies impacts individual
candidacies and the creation and/or strengthening of minor parties
and independent candidacies within major parties. RCV limits one
dominant party’s influence in primary and general elections and
creates space for more viable candidates. This means more variety
of ideological perspectives and more debate over nuances in
perspective. By creating more space for multiple candidates (and
parties) to viably take part, the conversation shifts, providing the
opportunity for dominant parties or candidates to adopt others ideas
in an effort to earn higher ranking with potential voters.33
Increased viability impacts voter engagement, tone of
campaigning, and turn-out for two reasons. First, candidates have
incentive to engage broader groups of people beyond their
traditional base, and conduct more positive campaigning when
multiple candidates run. Regarding engagement, a 2013-2014 study
conducted by Fair Vote comparing RCV and non-RCV cities in
California and Minnesota, showed that candidates in RCV cities
increased interpersonal interaction with voters through in-person
outreach, whereas in non-RCV cities candidates relied heavily on
outreach by phone.34 In-person outreach has the greatest impact on
social deliberative engagement—the reflective and interactive
processes of confirming, exploring, and/or changing individual
thoughts—which contributes to building in-person trust and
political knowledge.35 RCV incentivizes broad engagement because
candidates may have a chance of being 1st, 2nd, or 3rd choice,
whereas candidates in a plurality system will likely only reach out
33

See Katherine Q. Seelye, As Australia and the Oscars Go, So Goes
Maine? N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2018)
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/maine-ranked-choice-voting.html.
34
See, HALEY SMITH, Ranked Choice Voting and Participation:
Impacts on Deliberative Engagement, FAIR VOTE 9-10 (June 2016)
https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/DeliberativeEngagement.
35
Id. at 10.
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to the voters who are already most likely to support them.36 Second,
RCV incentivizes more positive campaigning by candidates and
parties. Several media-content studies indicate that coverage and
tone of campaigns was more positive and cooperative in RCV
cities. 37 Additionally, opportunity to rank, and the increased
viability of candidacies, has led to a third factor impacted by RCV:
increased voter turnout in primaries in RCV. 38 As a result of
broadened engagement and more positive campaigning, RCV
contributes to a shift in political culture. In turn, viability is likely
further impacted by these factors.
B. RCV leads to broader diversity of candidates.
With greater viability comes greater opportunity for more
racial, religious, gender, ethnic, and ideological diversity in
candidates. In a plurality system, the major parties pick the two
viable candidates. In doing so, the current system limits ideological
diversity and narrows the opportunity for other types of diversity
simply because there are (typically) only two viable candidates to
choose from. By contrast, RCV incentivizes more first-time
candidates and more candidates challenging incumbents. This, in
turn, enriches diversity in ideology as voters have the opportunity
through ranking to distinguish perspectives from major party
candidates. RCV, naturally, then creates more opportunity for
candidate diversity by broadening the field of candidates from
which the voter is free to rank according to preference.39
Greater viability of candidacies, representation from more
coalitions, and greater diversity of candidates, also provides
opportunities for major parties. New candidacies and new
coalitions serving as viable competition mean opportunity for
substantive and public debate of ideas—the foundation of
democracy—and help limit misuse of party power. This is good for
voters, candidates, parties, and democracy. Instead of a party
36

Id. at 11.
Id. at 4.
38
See, FAIRVOTE.ORG, The Adoption of Ranked Choice Voting
Raised Turnout 10 Points, https://fairvote.app.box.com/v/kimball-anthonyturnout (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). Note: While primary voter turnout
increased, there was no change in general election voter turnout. Id.
39
See supra text accompanying note 5.
37
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hoarding power for the benefit of individual leaders, the focus
should be on building coalitions based on shared values and
strategies. Through competition and debate, parties are pushed to
improve messages and strategies and expand perspectives. In this
regard, RCV creates greater accountability of candidates and
parties to the public and contributes to minimizing party leaders’
use of power to limit competition. Through RCV, voters and
communities have greater power to guide the political climate and
election results. This increased voter and community power would
be further impacted when intersecting election reforms are
accomplished, which will be further discussed.
C. Voters have greater choice through the RCV system.
Closely related to increased viability and diversity is
increased voter choice. Voters in RCV jurisdictions can vote for
their most preferred candidate(s) instead of weighing votes
strategically.40 This allows voters to vote, by rank, in alignment with
their ideological perspectives. By contrast, the plurality system acts
as disincentive to choosing the candidate you favor; if a preferred
candidate is not a favorite, you are forced to vote strategically or not
at all.41
D. RCV produces a true majority candidate more often than the
plurality system.
Lastly, RCV’s ranking approach increases the chance of a
true majority winner, meaning the candidate who wins with over
50% of the vote in the first round. 42 Comparatively, when the
instant-runoff process is used for races in which the first round does
not produce a true majority candidate, the instant-runoff process

40

See, Michael Lewyn, Two Cheers for Instant Runoff Voting, 6
PHOENIX L. REV. 117, 125 (2012).
41
See, David Cobb, Patrick Barrett & Caleb Kleppner, Preserving
and Expanding the Right to Vote: Ranked Choice Voting, ADVANCE: THE
JOURNAL OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS 107, 110 (2007).
42
See, FAIRVOTE.ORG Data On Ranked Choice Voting,
https://www.fairvote.org/data_on_rcv#research
_rcvsocialchoice (last visited Dec. 16, 2019).
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allows for finding “agreement through ranking,”43 which occurs as
a result of ranking and counting based on common ideology to find
a majority perspective.
E. What does the impact of RCV look like in American cities?
These four benefits of RCV are reflected in the data from
three cities that have implemented it for the lengthiest period of
time: San Francisco, Berkeley, and Minneapolis. Since these cities
implemented RCV, there appears to be a favorable, increasingly
democratic shift in the result of the elections and their processes. In
particular, all three of the cities’ data suggests greater viability and
diversity of candidates, increased voter choice, and high true
majority results in RCV elections.
San Francisco: 44 San Francisco implemented RCV in
municipal elections for eight elected offices in 2004 and allows
voters to choose up to three candidates per race. The local Board
of Elections is scheduled to offer ballots and equipment that will
increase the number of ranking lines to ten starting in 2019, thus
giving voters even greater choice. Based on a preliminary review
of the RCV data from fifty-eight San Francisco elections, there are
high numbers of candidates running for office, increased viability
and diversity, and high numbers of true majority winners. In 75.8%
of races (44 races) three or more candidates ran and only 12% (7)
had no contender. Though San Francisco had more than three
candidates in most races prior to RCV implementation (unlike
other cities), and therefore the number of candidates alone wasn’t
the major impact of RCV, reports have shown that voters have a
greater opportunity to voice their choice(s) and relay their layered
perspectives through the ranking process. In the most recent San
Francisco race for mayor 85% of voters ranked at least two

43
See, Lee Drutman, If We’re Abolishing the Electoral College, Let’s
Also Have Ranked Choice Voting for President, VOX, Mar. 21, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2019/3/21/18275785/electoral-college-rankedchoice-voting-president-democracy.
44
See Generally, CITY OF S.F. DEPT. OF ELECTIONS, past election
results, https://sfelections.sfgov.org/past-election-results.
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candidates and almost 70% ranked three.45 The large majority of
voters take the opportunity to rank. This suggests that voters are
exercising choice, but also implies that there are strong perceptions
of viability of the candidates they are ranking and that there may
be more candidates running who represent the perspectives of more
voters.46
In addition to numerous candidates, viability of candidacies,
and increased voter choice, there is both an increase in candidate
diversity, and a very large majority of races won with a true
majority. California counties that adopted RCV saw a 38% increase
in the numbers of non-white candidates running.47 Though it is not
clear if there is a direct link between the high numbers of candidates
running, viability, and diversity with those factors being represented
in who actually wins elections, it is safe to say that the “agreement
through ranking” concept that is core to RCV has played out in some
form, as evident in the data on true majority wins. Ninety-six
percent of the races evaluated resulted in a true majority (56 of 58
races) and 56.8% (33 of those 58) won that true majority in the 1st
round. The benefits of RCV voting evidenced in San Francisco’s
elections also appears in the two other cities examined.
Berkeley: 48 Berkeley implemented RCV in 2010 for the
Mayoral, Council, and Auditor general election races, and gives
45
See, FAIRVOTE.ORG, San Francisco Democratic Party Backs Ranked
Choice Voting,
(Sept. 4, 2018)
https://www.fairvoteca.org/san_francisco_democratic_party_backs_ranked_choi
ce_voting; Charlotte Hill, Christopher Jerdonek & Viva Mogi, SF Elections are
Working and Getting Even Better, S.F. EXAMINER, June 28, 2018,
https://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/sf-elections-are-working-and-gettingeven-better/.
46
Research on San Francisco races has shown that use of the
ranking option varies depending on factors such as number of candidates
running and competitiveness. Pedro Hernandez, San Francisco Report: RCV
is Working as Intended with Positive Voter Experience and Increase in Voter
Turnout and Use of Rankings, FAIRVOTE.ORG, May 23, 2018,
https://www.fairvoteca.org/san_francisco_report.
47
See FAIRVOTE.ORG, San Francisco Democratic Party Backs Ranked
Choice Voting, supra note 45.
48
ALAMEDA CNTY. REG. OF VOTERS, Archived Elections,
https://www.acvote.org/election-information/archived-elections.
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voters the option to rank up to three candidates per race.49 Since
implementation, Berkeley has seen an increase in the number of
candidates running, more diverse candidates, and a large majority of
races winning with a true majority. Since implementation, RCV was
used in twenty-five races for these seats. Eighty-four percent of
these races (21 of 25) had contenders, and 60% (15) had more than
two candidates running. Following the implementation of RCV,
there was a clear increase in voter choice—and, to at least some
degree, viability of candidacies—as more than two candidates ran
in most races compared to pre-RCV elections. In the 2004, 2006,
and 2008 races for Mayor, City Council, and Auditor, only 33% (3
of 9) of races had more than two candidates running. As noted
above, Berkley has also seen an increase in diversity of candidates
running since the inception of RCV, and 100% of races resulted in
a true majority—76% resulted in a true majority in the 1st round.
Minneapolis: 50 Minneapolis has experienced similar
improvements to democratic functioning as San Francisco and
Berkeley. The city combines the primary and general elections into
one election through the use of RCV, and allows voters to rank up
to three candidates on their ballot. The city uses RCV for the
election of Mayor, City Council, Board of Estimation and
Taxation, and Parks and Recreation. Out of forty-two RCV races
for Mayor and City Council since implementation in 2009, only 7%
of these races had no contenders, whereas 83.3% had more than
two candidates running, and 61.9% had more than three candidates.
In 2001 and 2005, the two election cycles for mayor and city
council preceding the implementation of RCV, no races for Mayor
or City Council had more than two candidates running. Like
Berkeley, there was a clear increase in viable candidacies and,
thereby, voter choice. Additionally, a review of the 2017 election
in Minneapolis showed an increase in the diversity of candidates
49

Id.
MINNEAPOLIS MINN. ELECTIONS & VOTER SERV., Election Results,
http://vote.minneapolismn.gov/
results/index.htm.
50
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and winners.51 In eighteen of twenty-two races across the city, a
woman and/or person of color ran, and a woman and/or person of
color won in twelve of these races.52
As noted previously though, there is not yet a clear direct
link between number of candidates running, greater viability, and
the majority winner. The Minneapolis RCV data similarly suggests
that the “agreement through ranking” concept was evident as
85.7% of these races resulted in a true majority and 69% resulted
in a true majority in the 1st round.
V. RCV OPPONENTS CHALLENGE ITS PROPOSED BENEFITS
Opponents to RCV put forth a number of arguments to
dissuade municipalities from adopting the process. 53 The most
common anti-RCV arguments are (1) RCV is too complex for voters
to understand; (2) RCV does not necessarily “give voters a greater
voice;” (3) RCV will disrupt important coalition building that
happens around our current two-party system; and (4) RCV is not
the best vehicle for expanding the political presence of minor
parties.54

51

FAIRVOTE MINNESOTA, Ranked Choice Voting 2017 Election Report,
https://www.fairvotemn.org/
ranked-choice-voting-2017-elections-report.
52
Id.
53
In its early form RCV was attacked as the voting system that
helped bring Hitler to power. See, Elsie S. Parker, Books in Review, 30 Nat’l
Mun. Rev. 313-14 (1941) (Reviewing Ferdinand A. Hermens, DEMOCRACY
OR ANARCHY,(1940)). But cf., Amy, supra note 20 at 207 (Arguing Hitler and
the Nazi party were the most popular party in Germany at the time and would
have handily won in a FPTP election).
54
Other arguments could be and have been made. Some have argued
against RCV for cost reasons. These authors do not address that argument in
full here, but will note, however, up to this point, over a dozen municipalities
have implemented RCV and none have found it cost prohibitive, nor is it
documented as a reason for repeal by the early adopters in the twentieth
century. Furthermore, the status quo generates other costs that are equally, if not
more, important to consider, including the cost of what a disenfranchised
society can mean for neighborhoods and the reduction of generational poverty.
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A. Is RCV Too Complex?
Since RCV was adopted, critics have argued that it is far too
complex for the average voter. This critique suggests that the
ranking process, number of lines, and array of choices make it too
complex. Voter education is certainly a worthy consideration; 55
however, research and a review of the history suggest that
complexity is not a barrier to RCV for voters. Additionally, even if
it were a barrier, it would not be insurmountable; it can be
overcome with education and refinement of the process.
Current research shows that the ranking process does not
confuse voters, and that over time voters become increasingly
engaged in the use of ranking to exercise choice. A review of the
2018 midterms in three RCV cities revealed low errors, and selfreports of satisfaction with the ranking process.56 In Minneapolis,
55

The infamous “butterfly ballot” incident is an example of a new
ballot system implemented in a FPTP race where more voter education was
necessary. See, Don van Natta, Jr. & Dana Canedy, The 2000 Elections: The
Palm Beach Ballot; Florida Democrats Say Ballot’s Design Hurt Gore, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/09/us/2000-electionspalm-beach-ballot-florida-democrats-say-ballot-s-design-hurt-gore.html
(recounting how one county in Florida, Palm Beach, had implemented a new
ballot system that year that led to 29,000 invalidated ballots due to voter
confusion on how to use the new ballots, which ostensibly had been redesigned
to be more legible for seniors). With respect to voter education, other
municipalities have implemented RCV giving us models to work from to
ensure the public is not disenfranchised in the same as thousands of Palm
Beach County voters; But see, Scott James, A critical spotlight shines on
Ranked Choice Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2011,
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/07/us/a-critical-spotlight-shines-on-rankedchoice-voting.html. (Expressing concern with San Francisco’s adoption of
RCV, citing the potential for voter confusion). As discussed, however, San
Francisco’s RCV process had been successful in increasing democracy.
Therefore, instead of a deterrent, James’ article serves as a reminder that voter
confusion concerns with respect to RCV, at this point, are largely unfounded.
56
THEO LANDSMAN, DREW SPENCER PENROSE, & ROB RICHIE, Ranked
Choice Voting in 2018: A Mid-Year Report: Analysis of Turn Out, Voter
Experience, and Election Administration,6 (July 2018)
https://www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_in_2018_a_mid_year_report.
(Noting that an exit poll of Santa Fe voters revealed a 96% satisfaction rate with
the voting experience)
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prior to rolling out RCV, the municipality took great pains to
prioritize voter education.57 The process included an early voting
trial, voter outreach for feedback on the trial, and a rework of the
system based on the trial results. Because of their diligence,
Minnesota successfully implemented the process in time for their
2009 elections, and Minnesota voters have been enjoying its benefits
since then.
Historically, anti-PR groups have contradicted themselves
when they argued that the process was overly complex. For
example, The New York Times editorial board argued that because
people were failing to rank all available candidates, the system was
too complex. In the same breath, however, the board contradicted
itself, noting that the Democrats had managed to use the new system
“adroitly” and that “Communists and others had become skilled in
‘bullet’ voting,” but the Republicans had failed to “make their voice
felt to a degree commensurate with their numbers.” 58 These
statements indicate the system could not have been prohibitively
complex, because otherwise Democrats, Communists, and “others”
would not have had such success using it. 59 The more likely
explanation, is that the Republicans had failed to earn a ranked vote,
and the Communists had managed to gain more votes than were
commensurate with their numbers. 60 Given the successful
navigation of the RCV process by voters both historically, and
contemporaneously in places like Minneapolis, Berkley and San
Francisco, there is no question that complexity is not a barrier to
pursuing the benefits of RCV. Nevertheless, for RCV efforts to
succeed, voter education on the process, and voter turnout, are key.

57
MINNEAPOLIS MINN. ELECTIONS & VOTER SERV.,
Minneapolis Ranked Choice Voting History,
http://vote.minneapolismn.gov/rcv/RCV-HISTORY.
58
See, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1947.
59
Paling in comparison to placing a man on the moon, the advent and
widespread use of computers and cell phones, and an economy that enables us to
buy and sell goods across the globe, RCV seems all the more achievable by those
standards.
60
See discussion supra Part II.
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B. Does RCV Violate the One Person One Vote Requirement?61
Opponents of RCV also argue the ranking system violates
the one person one vote constitutional requirement because it seeks
to eliminate “wasted votes.” 62 In Baber v. Dunlap, 63 Plaintiffs
argued Maine’s RCV law was an unconstitutional violation of the
one person one vote requirement. The court rejected this argument
and found instead that RCV “actually encourages First Amendment
expression.”64 In coming to its conclusion, the court noted Maine
citizens implemented RCV to espouse “third party and non-party
candidates” by giving voters the option to vote for their candidate(s)
of choice through the ranking process and thus dispense with the
spoiler effect. The court further noted that votes cast for an
unsuccessful first-choice candidate were not “rendered irrelevant or
diluted” as they were counted and distributed to the remaining
candidates based on the voter’s indicated preference, if any.65 As
stated by the court, an election methodology that seeks to increase
access to democracy and increase voters’ ability to more fully voice
an opinion with respect to candidates, can only be said to further
our constitutional right, making RCV an ideal choice for improving
our democracy.66

61

“Extend the sphere, and you take in a variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority [and under plurality, a minority] of the
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or, if
such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.” Baber v.
Dunlap, 376 F. Supp. at 137 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10).
62
In RCV, “wasted votes” can refer to two different problems. The
first are a voter’s first choice votes cast for the last place candidate. The
second are excess votes received by a candidate who receives more votes than
are necessary to win. The latter occurs with respect to multi-member districts.
See generally, How Proportional Representation Works supra note 10.
63
Baber, 376 F.Supp.3d at 137.
64
Id. at 145.
65
Id. at 141.
66
Id.
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C. Will RCV Adversely Impact the Two-Party System?
If history is any indication,67 then it is likely the two-party
system would be adversely impacted. However, what opponents
perceive as an adverse effect may simply be an evolution of the
electoral process. Americans are increasingly identifying as
independent. A 2018 Gallup Poll shows 42% of voters identify as
independent, 30% identify as Democrat, and 26% identify as
Republican.68 With more people seeking to be truly represented by
their party, RCV provides, in part, the catalyst needed to force
political parties to more definitively define their values and make
room for other parties that are willing to represent the values the
major parties refuse to. As we saw in PR, the likely result is that
major parties will hold a less powerful majority and incorporate
minor party views. 69 Therefore, this departure may be welcome
based on shifts in party affiliation and evidence of an electorate that
is actively choosing to decidedly reject “business as usual”
candidates, positions, and party politics. Both trends will be further
discussed in Section V, Timeliness of RCV.
D. Is RCV the best vehicle for expanding the political power of
minority parties?
The largest benefit to minority parties is the elimination of
the spoiler effect, which occurs when voters cast their vote
strategically, rather than according to preference, in order to avoid
“wasting” their vote on a candidate that has little chance of winning.
This causes a great problem for voters and for candidates.
67
It was the two major parties that targeted PR in the early 20th
century. See Shaw, supra note 23, at 590 (“From the beginning, the campaign
line-up showed partisan forces on the one side, and independents on the
other.”).
68
Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Continue to Embrace Political
Independence, GALLUP (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/245801/americans-continue-embrace-politicalindependence.aspx.
69
Of course, this may not be desirable. Some already argue the
breakdown in government we see today is due to major parties increasingly
moving away from the center, where compromise is more likely. Yet, others still
would wonder at the value of such compromise. Ultimately, however, this is a
balance that must continue to be studied and debated.
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Independent and minor party candidates are painted as non-viable
and blamed by members of the major party if it’s believed the
candidate detracted votes from the major party candidate. Similarly,
for voters who wish to vote in line with their values, they are also
susceptible to blame for the loss of major party candidates. The
most recent example of both instances, of course, is the 2016
election, in which Jill Stein’s candidacy and anti-Hillary Clinton
voters were demonized after Hillary Clinton lost the election to the
current President, Donald Trump.70
RCV provides a solution to both independent candidates and
independent voters because voters are given the option to rank and,
therefore there is no threat of “wasting” their vote. The second or
third place candidate can still win with a majority, and, as discussed,
the once outlier candidate has a greater potential to establish a viable
candidacy. This was borne out in PR, where a Communist candidate
garnered more first- place votes than any of the other candidates
running. 71 Therefore, RCV makes it possible for elections to be
more about principles than power, and, as a result, makes our
democracy stronger. However, as discussed in the companion
reforms section of this paper, RCV is not the only reform required
if minor parties are to be more successful.
VI. TIMELINESS OF RCV
In the wake of growing threats to our democracy, the
American electorate is both increasingly resistant to establishment
politics and supportive of RCV. Several examples of current events
show support for RCV, resistance to establishment politics, and
threats to our democracy. These events make clear the timeliness
of (re)consideration of RCV.
70

See, e.g., Anthony Zurcher, What Happened: The Long List of Who
Hillary Clinton Blames, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41244474; Tara Golshan, Did Jill
Stein Voters Deliver Trump Presidency?, VOX (Nov. 11, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13576798/jill-stein-thirdparty-donald-trump-win.
71
See discussion supra Part II.
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A. Support for RCV
In just the last three years, voters have chosen to adopt RCV
in three municipalities and one state. Maine became the first state
to adopt RCV in 2016 and began implementation in 2018. Amherst,
Massachusetts voted for RCV in 2018 and is pending
implementation for 2021. Lastly, two cities voted in this most recent
November 2019 election cycle to adopt the method as well: New
York City and East Hampton, Massachusetts. These additions bring
the count of RCV municipalities and regions to twenty-three.72 In
addition to increased support from the electorate, RCV was recently
boosted by the previously noted Baber case, which upheld the
constitutionality of the RCV method in Maine.73
In addition to these successes for RCV, legislation has been
proposed at the federal level and state level in New York as well.
The federal legislation, The Fair Representation Act, was proposed
in 2017 and, as of this writing, is currently sitting in committee. The
Act would establish the use of RCV to elect House representatives
and establish a commission to redistrict House seats to have
multiple members per district.74 Relatedly, a bill was proposed in
New York State in 2010 to establish a pilot study of RCV in eleven
municipalities across the state.75 The bill has been proposed every
session since 2010 and is currently sitting in the Elections
committee.76 These political and legal developments contribute to
the timeliness of the RCV method for expanding local and state
democracies. The electorate is energized by changes such as these,
as well as the number of first-time and independent candidates. The
growing RCV movement suggests an interest in stepping outside of
our current two-party system.
B. Resistance to Establishment Politics
Both wide support for independent candidates and the
increasing number of voters who identify as independent are
72

Where Ranked Choice Voting is Used, FAIRVOTEFAIRVOTE,
https://www.fairvote.org/where_is_ranked_choice_voting_used (last
visited Dec. 17, 2019).
73
See discussion supra nn. 61-63 and accompanying text.
74
Fair Representation Act, H.R. 3057, 115th
CongressCong. §1(a) (2017),).
75
A7492A, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009)).
76
S.2517, 2019-20 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
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evidence of the growing resistance to establishment politics.
Voters are tired of candidates who have toed party lines, had too
little engagement with the electorate, and engaged in backroom
deals that supersede the voice of voters. Therefore, voters mistrust
the two-party system and know that it limits (through laws and
practice) viability of independent and third party choices.
First, the country has increasingly seen voters support antiestablishment candidates and coalitions. Though voters are often
faced with tough choices due to the poor viability of independent
and minor party candidates and the potential for spoiler votes, they
want change. Examples span the course of the last decade: the rise
of the Tea Party; Bernie Sanders’ widely supported 2016 primary
race; the elections of President Trump, Congresswoman
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Congresswoman Ayana Presley;
the increase in independent candidates running for office over the
last several years that reached an unprecedented high in the 2018
midterms; 77 and wins by numerous, new, challengers to
incumbents in seats throughout New York State.78
Though we have seen high profile wins, voters are still too
often faced with voting strategically to limit risk and, as a result,
vote for a major-party candidate despite preferences for an
alternative or the desire to have other options at all.79 The bulk of
new candidates have been running in open seats (the majority of
77

Independent Candidates & The 2018 Election: What We Learned,
UNITE AM. (2019).), https://docsend.com/view/tdpge9n.
78
Grace Segers, How Alexandria Cortez Won the Race That
Shocked the Country, CITY & ST. N.Y.,. (June 27, 2018),
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/campaigns-elections/howalexandria-ocasio-cortez-won-race-shocked-country.html.
79
Discrepancy in pre-election polling of voters desires for independent
candidates in 2018 midterms did not match up with the resulting votes for
major party backed candidates. According to researchers for Unite America,
this may be attributed to several factors (social desirability bias, branding of
major parties, and election day hyper-partisanship activation). These authors
pose the possibility of these factors being philosophically intertwined with the
question of strategic voting and trust in process in relation to (and contrast
with) ideological perspectives. See, What We Learned supra note 75.

2019

WILLAMETTE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

63

whom are women and people of color).80 It is still very difficult for
new candidates (party affiliated or not) to challenge major partybacked incumbents. This is a viability issue that RCV, in
conjunction with companion reforms, can begin to address. As
previously discussed, RCV increases the number of women, new
candidates, and people of color in candidacies and elected office.81
A second major indicator of growing resistance to
establishment politics is the increasing number of Americans who
identify as independent and have moved away from association
with the two major parties over the last decade. At 42%, the number
of Americans who identify as independent has grown steadily over
the last decade as Democrat and Republican party bases have
diminished. 82 This suggests that voters have an array of
perspectives that are not, and cannot be, encompassed by two major
parties. Voters who identify as independent, however, are faced
with barriers to voting in primary elections across the nation, and
are forced to choose between refraining from voting in the general,
voting for a “spoiler” candidate, or voting for a viable candidate
(almost inevitably backed by a major party). As noted, independent
voters often end up choosing to vote for the viable candidate. This
phenomenon will only be exacerbated by the growing threats to
democracy evident across the nation.
C. Growing Threats to Democracy
Two current events (one national and one in New York
State) have drawn attention to some of the growing threats to voters,
candidates, and coalitions with non-binary political perspectives.
80

Jennifer Steinhauer, Insurgent Democrats, Many of Them Women,
Worry a New Party Policy Will Block Them, THE N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/us/politics/dccc-blacklist-incumbentpolicy.html.
81
Robert Boatright, Here’s what we’ve learned from the U.S.
congressional primaries so far, WASH. POST (June 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/05/hereswhat-weve-learned-from-the-u-s-congressional-primaries-so-far.
82
Jones, supra note 66.
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Both events are examples of the use of rule or policy changes that
threaten the already shaky viability of third party opportunities, thus
threatening to further limit democratic choice of voters. As a result,
RCV is, again, a timely consideration in relation to the increasing
affiliation of voters as independent who face existing and potential
barriers to voting for viable candidates outside of the existing twoparty domination.
First, the national Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee implemented a policy prohibiting contracts with firms
that work with primary challengers to Democrat incumbents. 83
This is problematic for several reasons. It is another hindrance to
non-major party backed candidates, as well as a symbolic action
taken to wield and ensure party power. This is incongruent with
the increasing desire of voters to vote independently. Relatedly,
and finally, it is a hindrance to voters (consciously and not) who
want to step out of strategic voting and away from the established
brand and “safety” of the two major parties.
Second, New York State’s Public Campaign Financing
Commission, created in 2019 to establish a public campaign
financing option, released several rule changes that threaten the
existence of minor parties and voter choice. The commission voted,
on November 25, 2019, to make three major changes that will
impact minor parties and independent candidates. First, the
commission voted to increase the threshold of votes needed for third
parties to have an ongoing line on a ballot from 50,000 in a
gubernatorial election year to130,000 biannually. 84 Second, the
commission voted to restrict eligibility for public financing of
Assembly and Senate seat races to donations from inside districts
while simultaneously refraining from limiting party committee
acquired donations to backed candidates.85 Third, the commission
83

Id.
Samar Khurshid, State Commission Approves New Campaign
Finance System, Raises Bar for Political Party Ballot Access, GOTHAM
GAZETTE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.gothamgazette.com/state/8952-statecommission-approves-new-campaign-finance-system-and-raises-bar-forpolitical-party-ballot-access.
85
Those who oppose the requirement of in-district donations say
this gives an advantage to incumbents and will make new-comer challenges
all the more difficult. See id.
84
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voted to raise the threshold of petition signatures for statewide races
from 15,000 to 45,0000.86 The legislature failed to hold a special
session and, therefore, the changes became law.87
These changes are widely debated. Opponents argue the
changes are intended to restrict minor parties and ensure major
party power and, specifically, to punish the Working Families
Party, which endorsed Governor Cuomo’s opponent in the last
gubernatorial race.88 Minor party candidates have only just been
able to meet the 50,000 vote threshold because of fusion voting
(another at-risk method in New York State), suggesting that it will
be that much harder to meet the higher threshold and could easily
threaten the viability of minor parties.89 Additionally, opponents
argue the sudden changes made by the commission toward more
restrictive rules suggest backroom dealing with the two prominent
leaders pushing for restrictions to minor parties (Governor Cuomo
and the State Democratic Committee Chairman). 90 Though the
commission has received praise for working to adopt a public
financing system that will help fund additional campaigns, the
commission has also been critiqued for stepping outside of the
public financing mission to restrict ballot access to third parties.91
86

Id.
Vivian Wang, Democrats’ Secret Plan to Kill Third Parties in New
York, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/29/nyregion/election-third-party-ny.html.
88
See, Khurshid, supra note 82.
89
The new threshold is more than 4 times the state-wide enrollment of
the Green Party; close to 3 times that of the Working Families Party, and more
than 13 times the state-wide enrollment of the Libertarian Party. The
Independence Party (widely regarded in WNY political circles as an arm of the
Republican party) is well above the amount with over 400,000 voters, and the
Conservative Party appears to be in safe territory as well, with around 160,000
voters state-wide. See NYS Voter Enrollment by County, Party Affiliation and
Status: Voters Registered as of Feb. 1, 2019, N.Y. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS at 9,
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/enrollment/county/county_feb19.pdf.
90
Karen DeWitt, Abrupt Reversal by NY Campaign Finance
Commission Leaves Supporters Wondering, WAMC N.E. PUB. RADIO (Oct.
25, 2019), https://www.wamc.org/post/abrupt-reversal-ny-campaignfinance-commission-leaves-supporters-wondering.
91
Brennan Center Responds to New York State Public Financing
Commission Vote and Draft Recommendations, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST.
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysisopinion/brennan-center-responds-new-york-state-public-financingcommission-vote.
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Moreover, arguably, the public financing rules themselves do not
truly level the playing field.
Proponents argue that the commission changes will make
elections less costly for the public and ensure the legitimacy of third
parties, which some argue are too often frivolous and create
confusion on the ballot.92 The Chair of the State Democratic Party
went so far as to argue that a “credible” minor party should be able
to produce the proposed numbers to get on the ballot.93 However,
these sweeping statements discount the history of voter choice (or
lack thereof) in this country, as well as other current, intersecting
election laws and rules that have ingrained the two-party system into
every step of the election process and ensured major barriers to
independent and minor party candidates (and their supporting
voters).
The commission’s changes favor incumbents (who will most
likely already have the backing of a major party, a fund base, and
name recognition) and major parties (which have established
resources and unrestricted additional donations), and, therefore,
threaten the democratic process for voters and candidates. The
growing number of independent voters already face an array of
barriers to vote in our democratic elections as they desire. They want
to support greater democracy through RCV, which would increase
overall election turnout. We should ask how to make election
processes more open, democratic, and easier for voters. RCV, in
conjunction with related reforms, has the potential to address the
challenge to minor parties and shift towards greater viability of more
of a variety of candidacies.
VII. RCV & COMPANION ELECTORAL REFORM
RCV exists interdependently within the context of other
election laws and reform efforts. As a result, RCV may be more
effective in furthering the growth of our democracy if supplemented
92

Wang, supra note 85.
Karen DeWitt, New York Public Finance Commission Plan
Condemned By State’s Minor Political Parties, WSKG NPR (Nov. 26,
2019), https://wskg.org/news/ny-public-finance-commission-plancondemned-by-states-minor-political-parties/.
93
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with additional reforms. Campaign finance, multimember districts,
and ballot access make strong potential companion reforms to
further the impact of RCV. They will be briefly examined here.
A. Campaign Finance Reform94
RCV alone cannot fix a flawed electoral system. Among the
companion reforms, campaign finance is key for striving toward a
more democratic system. From advertisements and literature to
candy for parades and refreshments for volunteers (and a new
development—childcare expenses), every campaign will cost some
money. Without it, candidates often fail to be taken seriously by the
media, potential donors, and the voters (who are forced to vote
strategically). To ease this burden, public financing is meant to
make it possible for lesser-known, or more independent candidates
to run for office in an arena that has long favored more popular,
well-funded candidates, who are better able to raise funds.
The need to ease this burden, in large part, stems from the
United States Supreme Court decision, Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, in which the court found that, just as
individuals, corporations have a First Amendment right to
contribute to campaigns, and, therefore, laws severely restricting
that right are unconstitutional.95 Since 2010 when it was decided,
Citizens United has been synonymous with the concept of allowing
“big money” into our elections, 96 and many have called for the
94

“There are two things that are important in politics. The first is
money, and I can’t remember what the second one is.”—Marcus Alonzo Hanna
quoted in Adam Winkler, WE THE CORPORATIONS 200 (2018); “A
corporation will subscribe to a political party only because the corporation
expects that party...to do something for the benefit of the corporation or to
refrain from doing something to its injury. No other motive can be imagined.”—
Alton Parker. Id. at 202.
95
Campaign Finance Reform, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/free-speech/campaign-finance-reform.
96
Id.; Though, corporate funds influencing elections has been an
increasing problem since at least the late 1800s. In his book, We the
Corporations, Adam Winkler notes a famous political cartoon, The Bosses of
the Senate, that depicts the extent to which it was popularly believed (and for
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decision to be overturned.97 Citizens United is one area of focus in
relation to campaign finance reform; however, an assessment of
methods of public financing is an additional and necessary area for
consideration.
Public financing can take many forms. Interestingly, since
1958, Germany has publicly financed political parties who act as a
conduit for the funds to individual candidates. 98 Currently, the
government allots up to 133 million Euros to each party, including
minor parties.99 In the United States, President Theodore Roosevelt,
circa 1910, advocated for a similar system, calling for Congress to
appropriate the sums needed to cover the “proper and legitimate
expenses of each of the great national parties.” 100 But the major
parties already have too much power; even if minor parties could
stand to benefit from such an approach, we hesitate to recommend
such a model here.
Other models do appear to lend themselves more to
empowering individuals (as opposed to large money donors). One
method, currently available in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, is
good reason I’m sure) corporate funds were influencing elections; he goes on to
explain how Marus Alonzo Hanna modernized the political campaign to rely
more heavily on corporations, an effort which resulted in the most money raised
for a presidential campaign at the time ($7million); and, finally, how
corporations were still very much a part of the politics at the beginning of the
twentieth century when a scandal erupted as it was discovered 70% of Theodore
Roosevelt’s campaign funds were attributed to corporate donations, a fact he had
vehemently denied (to protect his image Theodore Roosevelt fought for laws to
restrict corporate donations). See Adam Winkler, We the Corporations: How
American Businesses Won Their Civil Rights 196-205 (2018). Winkler
concludes, “[a]lthough Citizens United and Hobby Lobby brought new public
attention and scrutiny to corporate rights, long before those controversial cases
were decided corporations had already taken their place among We the People.”
Id. at 395 (alteration in original).
97
Id.
98
Campaign Finance: Germany, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/campaign-finance/germany.php.
99
Id. The only requirement to receive funds as a party is to receive
.5% of the vote. In New York, if 12 million people voted that would be
60,000 votes. Cf. New York’s new public financing rules, in which a party
isn’t even eligible to appear on the ballot with less than 130,000 votes.
100
See Public Campaign Financing: Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES., http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/public-financing-of-campaigns-overview.aspx (last visited Jan.
20, 2020).
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the Clean Elections Method. Under this method, candidates are
encouraged to obtain small dollar donations (typically $5 or less)
and if a certain threshold is met, the state will give the candidate the
maximum amount of dollars for the race.101 In 2014, the maximum
amount of money for Arizona’s gubernatorial race was $1.1
million.102
Another method is matching donations, which is available
to candidates in New York City. Candidates for eligible positions
agree to fund limits, spending limits, and financial disclosure
reports, and in exchange they are awarded $8 public for every $1
donated.103 In New York State’s implementation of the matching
funds program by the Public Finance Commission, however, we are
reminded that laudable intentions may still fall prey to political
gamesmanship.104
As of February 2019, fourteen states offer some form of
public financing. The system is not perfect; however, if paired
with the benefits of RCV, our findings lead us to believe that
public financing campaign programs will become more valuable,
offering greater opportunities to independent candidacies and
greater opportunities for a new generation of leaders.
B. Multi-member districts: What can we learn from history?
A single representative can’t possibly represent all the
interests of a district, and from the history of PR (discussed in
Section II: RCV History), there is already a vision of what multimember districts would look like in the modern day. The vision
offers the promise of greater, more effective representation of the
electorate and a greater, more collegial democratic process.
Therefore, these authors suggest it here as a companion reform.

101

Id.
Id.
103
See Join the Matching Funds Program, N.Y. CITY CAMPAIGN FIN.
BD., https://www.nyccfb.info/candidate-services/join/ (last visited Dec. 16,
2019).
104
See discussion supra Part V.C.
102
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As for the mechanics of counting votes in a multi-member
district, the RCV process in a multi-member district (PR or STV)
operates similarly to that of a single-member district in that voters
have the opportunity to rank candidates on their individual ballots.
If a majority winner results from the first round, that candidate is
the winner and use of the instant run-off process is not necessary.
If there is no majority winner, the instant-runoff process ensues,
with votes from the candidate with the least first choice votes being
distributed in each subsequent round.105 The difference in a multimember district is that “excess votes” from candidates who have
already met the threshold to win are also distributed. 106 This
process is continued until winning candidates are identified for
each available vacancy.
Though this paper recommends multi-member districts as a
companion reform to RCV, non-RCV multi-member districts have
had challenges that are worth recognizing and avoiding in moving
forward. In Thornburg v. Gingles, 107 the United States Supreme
Court heard arguments on whether five multi-member districts and
one single-member district in North Carolina diluted the votes of
African American voters, violating §2 of the Voting Rights Act. The
court found the multi-member districts did indeed affect the ability
of the minority community to elect their representative of choice.108
In support of its finding, the lower court noted the multi-member
district structure was problematic when combined with targeted race
campaigns, the State’s history of voter suppression, and other
troubling data such as the fact that white voters declined to vote for
African-American voters at least two-thirds of the time.109 Relying
on these facts, the Court ultimately affirmed that the multimember
district structure had, indeed, effectively disenfranchised African
American voters.110

105
106

10.

107
108

See discussion supra Part I.
See How Proportional Representation Elections Work, supra note

478 U.S. 30 (1985).
Id. at 80.
109
Id. at 59, 80.
110
Id. at 80.
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For two reasons, this, however, is no reason to reject
multimember districts. First, there are many forms of multi-member
districts. As we saw with the RCV multimember option adopted in
the U.S. in the early twentieth century, minority communities had
more success with that system than ever before prior to its
enactment. Second, due to gerrymandering, it is possible for African
American voters to just as easily be disenfranchised in singlemember districts.111 Therefore, while certain multi-member districts
have been problematic for communities of color, PR’s history
suggests the potential of multi-member districts to increase political
inclusion for minorities, and, as a result, should be explored as a
further enhancement to the benefits RCV offers.
C. Ballot access reforms
Ballot access is another necessary companion reform to
support improved democratic functioning generally and to support
the effectiveness of RCV. In order for RCV to effectively give
voters greater choice through viable and diverse candidacies, a
broad array of candidates need to get on the ballot. Currently,
independent and minor party candidates face numerous challenges
throughout the process of getting on the ballot. From acquiring
signatures to disputing challenges to petitions, the process favors
highly established and funded major parties and their candidates.
Unlike major party backed candidates, other candidates
often face an uphill battle to get on the ballot when petitioning
signatures are required as a prerequisite. Resources such as
111
In the City of Buffalo, one particular council district has been
unable to elect an African American for decades, despite a significant amount
of the district being made up of majority African American neighborhoods.
The unusual horseshoe shape of the district is evidence of a district cobbled
together in such a way as to dilute the votes of African Americans in the
district. In 2019, again, the district was unable to elect an African American
representative despite the candidacies of four African Americans in total. A
quick analysis of the election numbers reveals even in a multi-member (PR)
scenario with two seats available, the other white candidate in the race would
have come in second place. In other words, because of the drawing of the
district, Black representation would only have been possible if three seats were
available, reinforcing, yet again, the idea that RCV is only one tool of many
that must be examined in moving toward a more democratic system.
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financial and human capital are often inadequate. Additionally,
minor party candidates face the challenge of obtaining enough
signatures from the smaller pool of eligible voters (who are
affiliated with that minor party).112
Even if candidates are able to meet the threshold for
signatures and then file, the challenging process is fraught with
difficulties and, arguably, undemocratic as well. 113 Though the
process was originally established to reduce and deter fraud,
candidates and parties are able to use the process to knock
candidates off the ballot simply to reduce competition. When
candidates are challenging the system independently, there is
increased room for error in minor and major technicalities that can
weaken chances of successfully disputing a challenge. 114
Candidates (including major party candidates) are encouraged to get
three times the requirement to account for errors (unclear signatures,
missing zip code or city, etc.),115 but this then brings us back to the
challenge for independent and minor party candidates of getting
even the threshold requirement. Additionally, because independent
candidates often do not have the resources to challenge the major
party endorsed candidate, there is not an equitable opportunity to
“use” the process to knock those candidates off the ballot.
Objections to a designating petition in New York State must be filed
within three days.116 That is not necessarily a feasible time frame for
minor party or independent candidates who likely do not have access
to adequate resources to review and file objections. Lastly, it is
undemocratic to knock off competition before the electorate has
even had an opportunity to weigh in through a full vote.117 Though
112

DeNora Getachew, Understanding the Labyrinth: New York’s
Ballot Access Laws, GOTHAM GAZETTE,
https://www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/advertise/252-understanding-thelabyrinth-new-yorks-ballot-access-laws.
113
Both authors are unfortunate enough to have been witness and
subject to this process in the local political arena.
114
Alan Bedenko, Electoral Malpractice, THE PUB., Apr. 18, 2019
(Reporting on five independent candidates [all women] whose ballots were
challenged for technical deficiencies),
http://www.dailypublic.com/articles/04182019/electoral-malpractice.
115
DeNora Getachew, Understanding the Labyrinth: New York’s
Ballot Access Laws, supra n.____.
116
Running for Office, N.Y. ST. BD. OF ELECTIONS,
https://www.elections.ny.gov/RunningOffice.html.
117
As opposed to challenges to legitimately fraudulent petitions.
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some may argue that petitioning is an opportunity for the electorate
to weigh in on the legitimacy of a candidate to be considered for
elected office, this argument does not take into account the full
picture: lack of resources, knowledge of the process, and the fact
that the petitioning process itself does not allow all voters (or all
voters within that party) the opportunity to weigh in.
Some states have implemented alternatives to petitioning for
signatures. One alternative is the submission of filing fees for
certain political races; however, those states that allow this are
constitutionally required to provide the option to file as indigent if
the cost of the fee is too high for a candidate.118 Depending on the
state, the indigent candidate may be excused, given the alternative
option of petitioning for signatures, or pay a reduced fee.119 Some
argue for the alternative of open ballot access entirely and others
express concern about having chaotic and confusing ballots,
illegitimate parties, or fraud without at least some ballot access
requirements.
Ballot access is a necessary companion reform to support
improved democratic functioning. With RCV, more minor party and
independent candidates have greater opportunities to get on the
ballot. If ballot access is going to be limited in some form, it should
be considered contextually to allow for fair and equitable
opportunities for democratic processes to proceed. To do this, more
questions need to be asked. If filing fees are required, are they
nominal across the board or are fees tiered depending on resources?
If petitioning signatures are required, are the requirements across
the board, dependent on party member numbers or geography, or
dependent on the resources of coalition/ party affiliation?120 Is it
possible for voters to sign for more than one candidate?121 Lastly,
118

Filing Fees for Candidates for State Legislator, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (July 7, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-andcampaigns/filing-fees-for-candidates-for-state-legislators.aspx.
119
Id.
120
Getting on the Ballot: What it Takes, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, 27 The Canvass: State and Election Reform 1-3 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/elect/Canvass_Feb_2012_
No_27.pdf.
121
In New York, a voter cannot sign more than one petition for an
office unless there is more than one vacancy for the office. N.Y. Election Law §

74

SOCIAL JUSTICE & EQUITY JOURNAL

Vol. 3:2

what are the deadline requirements for new parties? We will move
toward a better democracy if we ask such questions.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is incumbent upon us as citizens to be proactive in
responding to the growing threats to our democracy by considering
the use of RCV and suggested companion reforms for the betterment
of our democracy. As the health of democracy is on the minds of so
many Americans, let us remember our history and look at our
present in which we see more governments choosing the benefits of
RCV that we once chose to forego as a result of prejudice and fear.
Let us also look to our future and all we stand to gain in
implementing RCV and its companion reforms. Finally, in our
current political state Franklin D. Roosevelt’s words ring truer than
ever: “the only thing to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning,
unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat
into advance.”121

6-134(3). As a result, it is a common strategy for major party candidates to
“steal.”

